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DISC AFTER FOUR YEARS: 
REASSESSMENT NEEDED 
By Michael J. McIntyre 
The time has now come to reassess the judgment made in 1971 
when the original domestic international sales corporation (DISC) 
legislation was approved by Congress. At that time, the United 
States had an overvalued currency which was causing domestically 
produced goods to be overpriced abroad. Unwilling to formally 
devalue the dollar, we felt compelled to adopt a series of in-
direct measures to accomplish the same result. In the wake of 
the restructuring of the international financial system that has 
since taken place, most of these measures -- the interest equali-
zation tax, the foreign direct investment controls, and the 
Federal Reserve Board's restrictions on foreign borrowing -- have 
now been repealed. The question for the Ways and Means Committee 
is whether DISC should go the same way. 
When DISC was being debated in 1970 and 1971, allegations 
were made by supporters and opponents of the legislation, with 
no easy way of determining who was correct. After several years 
experience with DISC, however, the following statements can no 
longer be seriously disputed: 
Cost Effectiveness Challenged 
1. DISC provides no significant benefits to small busi-
ness. At the time of its enactment, Treasury spokesmen asserted 
that DISC would make it possible for small businessmen to enjoy 
the benefits of tax deferral then available to multinational 
corporations through manipulation of the minimum distribution 
provisions of Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code. Treasury 
data now show, however, thal three-quarters of DISC benefits go 
to corporations with assets in excess of $250 million, and sub-
stantially all of the remaining beneficiaries have assets in 
excess of $100 million dollars. Tax reform advocates who pre-
dicted this result in 1971 have been proved correct. 
Dr. McIntyre is visiting associate professor of law at the Wayne 
State University Law School in Detroit. 
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2. DISC is one of our most expensive tax expenditure 
items. In enacting the DISC legislation in 1971, Congress 
anticipated an annual revenue loss of less than $200 million. 
In fact, the definition of "producers loans" given in the sta-
tute was expected to reduce the tax loss substantially after the 
first 10 years of operation. Our experience with DISC has shown 
that these assumptions were in error. For 1975, the estimated 
revenue loss has been pegged at $1.6 billion and rising, putting 
DISC near the very top of the tax expenditures list. 
3. DISC produces no measurable increase in exports. After 
two extensive studies of DISC by the Treasury Department and a 
careful study by the Office of Management and Budget, no evi-
dence has been produced which demonstrates -- or even strongly 
suggests -- that DISC has been a significant factor in the 
volume of United States exports. Exports have increased dramat-
ically since the enactment of DISC in 1971, but this increase is 
explained almost entirely by the devaluation of the dollar and 
the shift for most important world currencies to a system of 
floating exchange rates. Further study of DISC is unlikely to 
produce important new information, for the effects of DISC are 
virtually impossible to isolate. We know for certain that what-
ever the role of DISC, its impact on exports is minor and the 
cost is very high. Congress rarely has had so much data on any 
tax provision. (For story on Treasury study, see Tax Notes, 
April 21, page 3. For stories on the 0MB report, see Tax Notes, 
May 14, pages 3 and 5.) 
4. Repeal of DISC would simplify our tax laws. In testi-
mony presented to the House Ways and Means Committee in 1971 
I stated: 
"The DISC legislation is amazingly complex .... 
The original DISC proposal was several dozen pages of 
very technical prose, and it has gotten even more com-
plex along the way. There are over 30 new concepts in 
the proposed bill, each requiring pages of regulations 
for explication. It is unlikely that any but the most 
tax sophisticated companies could deal with these 
complexities." 
My prediction turns out to have been conservative. Even sophis-
ticated companies have had trouble understanding DISC. The re-
sulting uncertainties have rewarded the more adventurous and 
penalized those with more refined tax consciences. 
As the above statements indicate, none of the major ob-
jectives of DISC have been achieved. What is perhaps more 
important, the objective of artificially increasing exports is 
no longer in the national interest. If DISC does in face have a 
• 
positive impact on exports, the effect is to create unnecessary ~ ... ·,,
shortages of goods at ho~e. ~ 
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Similarly, since the introduction of floating exchange rates 
in February 1973, exports and imports are kept in rough balance. 
Any increase in jobs from export stimulation would be offset by 
a loss of jobs from increased imports. 
Trade Negotiation Chip? 
Most supporters of DISC, including Secretary of the 
Treasury William E. Simon, seem to acknowledge that the old 
justifications no longer have much merit. The most interesting 
new argument being advanced is that DISC is needed as a bargain-
ing chip for the multilateral trade negotiations under way in 
Geneva. Its usefulness as a bargaining chip is certainly ques-
tionable, since our major trading partners feel that DISC 
violates our international obligations under the General Agree-
ment for Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 : They have, in fact, lodged a 
formal protest against us which is now in litigation. Aside 
from such practicalities, one would think Congress would be un-
willing to relinquish control over a piece of tax legislation of 
such major importance. Our domestic tax rules for our oil 
industry, for our export businesses, or for any sector of the 
economy should be set by Congress, not by Treasury in consulta-
tion with foreign governments. 
If Congress moves to abolish DISC as tax reform leaders on 
the Ways and Means Committee have urged, some attention would 
have to be given to a technique that would be fair. One method 
would be to treat all DISC income earned after a certain date as 
being currently distributed to shareholders with transitional 
rules providing for realization of all deferred income over a 
five-year pericd. 
Questions and Answers About DISC 
Following are a series of questions put to 
Dr. McIntyre by the House Ways and Means Committee 
during testimony last July 23 and his answers to 
those questions. 
1. Question: Does DISC act as a significant stimulus to U.S. 
exports? 
Answer: No. All of the available data, including two stud-
ies of DISC by the Department of Treasury, indicate that DISC 
has not caused a measurable increase in overall exports. The 
huge revenue loss from DISC has simply increased the profits 
of the export sector of the economy. Our trade picture is 
determined almost exclusively by the relative cost structures 
of U.S. producers and their competitors and by the relative 
value of the dollar against foreign currencies. 
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The ineffectiveness of DISC has two causes. First of all, ~ 
by applying to all exports, not just the increase in exports, 
the bulk of the. tax revenue lost through DISC goes to ex-
porters for simply maintaining the status quo. Even the 
revenue loss resulting from increases in exports does not act 
as an incentive in most situations, since the increases in 
sales are generally caused by economic factors not within the 
control of individual businesses. For example, the increase 
in grain sales abroad over the past few years is widely 
acknowledged even by supporters of DISC to have been causect 
by external factors unrelated to any export subsidy. 
The second cause of the ineffectiveness of DISC results 
from the change to a system of floating exchange rates in 
February 1973. It should be noted that the Treasury studies 
which found no substantial incentive effect of DISC related 
to periods before the floating exchange system went into 
effect. With floating exchange rates, international money 
markets tend to adjust for any export incentives. Even if 
the incentives stimulated certain exports, these gains would 
be at the expense of other exports or would be offset by 
increased imports. 
2. Question: What is the relationship between the rate of un-
employment and the condition of our balance of payments? 
In particular, is there evidence to show that balance of 
payments surpluses enjoyed by some of our trading partners 
have resulted in lower unemployment rates? 
Answer: Rates of unemployment seem to result from the basic 
structure of the domestic economy and are quite insensitive 
to international trade. For example, Germany, which over 
the past several years has had a surplus in its balance of 
payments, and the United Kingdom, which has had a deficit, 
both have unemployment rates significantly below the U.S. 
rate. Economists who have attempted to find a correlation 
have been unsuccessful, and the general conclusion of 
economists is that whatever connection may exist is too in-
significant to measure. . .It should be kept in mind that 
even if we could export unemployment by means of export sub-
sidies, any temporary gain would soon be offset by retali-
atory measures by our trading partners. 
3. Question: Is there no merit to the claims of DISC supporters 
that the incentive has a significant impact on U.S. jobs? 
Answer: No. There is no evidence that DISC has had any 
overall impact on jobs. 
As stated above, unemployment rates are not very sensitive 




our imports and exports are in balance, jobs gained by in-
creases in exports will in large measure be lost by increases 
in impor.ts. In evaluating claims by individual companies 
that DISC has increased jobs, the following points should be 
kept in mind: (1) Gains by one company may be offset by 
losses from another company. Generalizations from the ex-
perience of a few companies does not give a reliable picture 
of what is going on for the whole economy. (2) Corporate 
executives are poor judges of the economic factors determin-
ing their conduct. What may appear to them to be the result 
of DISC is much more likely to be the result of a relative 
change in the value of the dollar. (3) Disc provides large 
tax savings to exporters. Statements on the effects of 
DISC are therefore self serving and will tend to be optimis-
tic. 
4. Question: If DISC has not had a significant impact on ex-
ports, why are our European trading partners protesting our 
use of DISC to the Council of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)? In other words, can't we assume 
that DISC is working if our trading partners are objecting 
to it? 
Answer: Relying on the judgment of our trading partners on 
this issue is nonsensical; they do not, after all, have the 
data on DISC available to this committee. It is equally 
reasonable to ask: Why, if our trading partners think DISC 
is effective, have they not followed our example and set up 
DISC legislation of their own? 
Three possible explanations are available to explain the 
protest of the European Economic Community to the GATT 
Council. First of all, the protest was lodged back in 1971, 
well before the shift to floating exchange rates in 1973 
which now make export subsidies obsolete. Secondly, the EEC 
may simply be uninformed about the effects of DISC. Or they 
may believe that it distorts the pattern of trade, even 
though it does not affect our overall trade picture, since 
the benefits of DISC are not the same for all types of in-
dustry. Thirdly, they may be protecting their rights under 
GATT as a matter of principle. If DISC went unchallenged, a 
precedent would be set which they might feel went against the 
spirit of GATT and against their long range economic interests. 
A loss of our case at GATT would of course hurt our bargain-
ing position in future GATT negotiations. 
s. Question: Would it make sense for this committee to eliminate 
DISC benefits for certain segments of the economy, such as 




Answer: No., it would not. The arguments against DISC are 
relevant for all sectors of our export economy. In 1970, in 
testim9ny presented to the Treasury Department, I suggested 
that if DISC were to be enacted, the benefits should be 
limited to products which were likely to be affected by an 
export subsidy. At that time, our agricultural products were 
very competitive as to price and the obstacle to export was 
the restrictive trade practices of our trading partners, who 
felt it necessary to protect an inefficient but politically 
powerful agricultural sector. I therefore suggested that 
agricultural products be excluded from DISC benefits, a sug-
gestion which, if followed, would have saved the Treasury 
millions in windfall tax expenditures. The situation in 
1975, however, is quite different. With floating exchange 
rates, the dollar is no longer overvalued. The windfall to 
agricultural exporters is no greater than the windfall to 
any other exporters. 
6. Question: Supporters of DISC claim that its repeal would 
amount to unilateral economic disarmament. Is this claim 
correct? 
Answer: Only in the sense that disbandment of the mounted 
cavalry in the 1940's constituted unilateral military dis-
armament. DISC is obsolete. It makes no more sense in 
this day of floating exchange rates than the mounted 
cavalry did in the age of tanks and high powered artillery. 
TI1e views expressed in this article are those of the author 
and do not represent a position on legislation by Tax 
Notes or its publisher, Tax Analysts and Advocates. Tax 
Notes strives to present a variety of views on tax policy and 
welcomes articles presenting opposing views on policy options. 
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FORD NOMINATED FOR WAYS AND MEANS 
Rep. Harold E. Ford, D-Tenn., has been nominated by the 
Democratic Steering and Policy Committee to the seat on the Ways 
and Means Committee left vacant by the resignation of Richard 
H. Fulton, D-Tenn., elected mayor of Nashville, Tenn., August 7. 
The Democratic Caucus will meet Tuesday, September 30 to act 
on the nomination. Ford is a freshman from the Eighth District 
of Tennessee. He is also a member of the Banking, Currency and 
Housing Committee, the Select Committee on Aging, the Veterans' 
Affairs Committee and the Congressional Black Caucus. He scored 
57 out of a possible 100 on a tax reform voting scale prepared 
in July 1975 by Taxation with Representation. (See Tax Notes, 
July 14, page 3.) ( 
